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We prove that adding upwards closed first-order dependency atoms to first-order logic with team se-
mantics does not increase its expressive power (with respect to sentences), and that the same remains
true if we also add constancy atoms. As a consequence, the negations of functional dependence,
conditional independence, inclusion and exclusion atoms can all be added to first-order logic without
increasing its expressive power.
Furthermore, we define a class of bounded upwards closed dependencies and we prove that
unbounded dependencies cannot be defined in terms of bounded ones.
1 Introduction
Team semantics is a generalization of Tarski’s semantics in which formulas are satisfied or not satisfied
by sets of assignments, called teams, rather than by single assignments. It was originally developed by
Hodges, in [14], as a compositional alternative to the imperfect-information game theoretic semantics
for independence friendly logic [13, 18].
Over the past few years team semantics has been used to specify and study many other extensions
of first-order logic. In particular, since a team describes a relation between the elements of its model
team semantics offers a natural way to add to first-order logic atoms corresponding to database-theoretic
dependency notions.
This line of thought led first to the development of dependence logic [19], and later to that of in-
dependence logic [12] and inclusion and exclusion logics [8].1 By now there are many results in the
literature concerning the properties of these logics, and in Section 2 we recall some of the principal ones.
One common characteristic of all these logics is that they are much stronger than first-order logic
proper, even though they merely add first-order definable dependency conditions to its language. Indeed,
the rules of team semantics straddle the line between first and second order, since they evaluate first-order
connectives by means of second-order machinery: and, while in the case of first-order logic formulas
team semantics can be reduced to Tarski’s semantics, if we add to our language atoms corresponding to
further conditions the second-order nature of team semantics can take over.
The purpose of the present paper is to investigate the boundary between first and second order “from
below”, so to say, taking first-order logic with team semantics and trying to find out how much we can
add to it while preserving first-orderness. In Section 3 we define a fairly general family of classes of
first-order definable dependency conditions and prove they can be safely added to first-order logic; then
in Section 4 we expand this family, and in Section 5 we show that, as a consequence, the negations of
all the main dependency atoms studied in team semantics do not “blow up” first-order logic into a higher
∗Research supported by Grant 264917 of the Academy of Finland.
1The literature contains many other extensions of first-order logic with team semantics, but we do not examine them in this
work.
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order one. Finally, in Section 6 we introduce a notion of boundedness for dependencies and use it to
demonstrate some non-definability results.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we will recall some fundamental definitions and results concerning team semantics.
Definition 1 (Team) Let M be a first-order model and let Dom(M) be the set of its elements.2 Further-
more, let V be a finite set of variables. Then a team X over M with domain Dom(X) = V is a set of
assignments s from V to Dom(M).
Given a team X and a tuple of variables ~v contained in the domain of X, we write X ↾~v for the team
obtained by restricting all assignments of X to the variables of ~v and X(~v) for the relation {s(~v) : s ∈
X} ⊆ Dom(M)|~v|.
As it is common when working with team semantics, we will assume that all our expressions are in
negation normal form.
Definition 2 (Team Semantics for First-Order Logic) Let φ(~x) be a first-order formula in negation
normal form with free variables in~x. Furthermore, let M be a first-order model whose signature contains
the signature of φ and let X be a team over it whose domain contains ~x. Then we say that X satisfies φ
in M, and we write M |=X φ , if and only if this follows from these rules:3
TS-lit: For all first-order literals α , M |=X α if and only if for all s ∈ X, M |=s α according to the usual
Tarski semantics;
TS-∨: For all ψ and θ , M |=X ψ ∨ θ if and only if X = Y ∪ Z for two subteams Y and Z such that
M |=Y ψ and M |=Z θ ;
TS-∧: For all ψ and θ , M |=X ψ ∧θ if and only if M |=X ψ and M |=X θ ;
TS-∃: For all ψ and all variables v, M |=X ∃vψ if and only if there exists a function
H : X →P(Dom(M))\{ /0}
such that M |=X [H/v] ψ , where X [H/v] = {s[m/v] : s ∈ X ,m ∈ H(s)} and P(Dom(M)) is the pow-
erset of Dom(M);
TS-∀: For all ψ and all variables v, M |=X ∀vψ if and only if M |=X [M/v] ψ , where X [M/v] = {s[m/v] :
s ∈ X ,m ∈ M}.
Given a sentence (that is, a formula with no free variables) φ and a model M over its signature, we
say that φ is true in M and we write M |= φ if and only if M |={ /0} φ .4
The following is a useful and easily derived rule:
Lemma 3 Let ~v = v1 . . .vn be a tuple of n variables and let ∃~vψ be a shorthand for ∃v1 . . .∃vnψ . Then
M |=X ∃~vψ if and only if there exists a function H : X → P(Dom(M)n)\{ /0} such that M |=X [H/~v] ψ ,
where X [H/~v] = {s[~m/~v] : s ∈ X ,~m ∈ H(s)}.
2We always assume that models have at least two elements in their domain.
3What we give here is the so-called lax version of team semantics. There also exists a strict version, with slightly different
rules for disjunction and existential quantification; but as pointed out in [8], locality – in the sense of Theorem 8 here – fails
in strict team semantics for some of the logics we are interested in. Therefore, in this work we will only deal with lax team
semantics.
4Of course, one should not confuse the team { /0}, which contains only the empty assignment, with the empty team /0, which
contains no assignments at all.
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With respect to first-order formulas, team semantics can be reduced to Tarski’s semantics. Indeed,
Proposition 4 ([14, 19]) Let φ(~x) be a first-order formula in negation normal form with free variables
in~x. Furthermore, let M be a first-order model whose signature contains that of φ , and let X be a team
over M whose domain contains ~x. Then M |=X φ if and only if, for all s ∈ X, M |=s φ with respect to
Tarski’s semantics.
In particular, a first-order sentence φ is true in a model M with respect to team semantics if and only
if it is true in M with respect to Tarski’s semantics.
Therefore, not all first-order definable properties of relations correspond to the satisfaction conditions of
first-order formulas: for example, the non-emptiness of a relation R is definable by ∃~xR~x, but there is no
first order φ such that M |=X φ if and only if X 6= /0. More in general, let φ∗(R) be a first-order sentence
specifying a property of the k-ary relation R and let ~x = x1 . . .xk be a tuple of new variables: then, as it
follows easily from the above proposition, there exists a first-order formula φ(~x) such that
M |=X φ(~x)⇔M,X(~x) |= φ∗(R)
if and only if φ∗(R) can be put in the form ∀~x(R~x → θ(~x)) for some θ in which R does not occur.5
It is hence possible to extend first-order logic (with team semantics) by introducing new atoms corre-
sponding to further properties of relations. Database theory is a most natural choice as a source for such
properties; and, in the rest of this section, we will recall the fundamental database-theoretic extensions
of first-order logic with team semantics and some of their properties.
Dependence logic FO(=(·, ·)), from [19], adds to first-order logic functional dependence atoms
=(~x,~y) based on database-theoretic functional dependencies ([2]). Their rule in team semantics is
TS-fdep: M |=X=(~x,~y) if and only if for all s,s′ ∈ X , s(~x) = s′(~x)⇒ s(~y) = s′(~y).
This atom, and dependence logic as a whole, is downwards closed: for all dependence logic formulas
φ , models M and teams X , if M |=X φ then M |=Y φ for all Y ⊆ X . It is not however union closed: if
M |=X φ and M |=Y φ then we cannot in general conclude that M |=X∪Y φ .
Dependence logic is equivalent to existential second-order logic over sentences:
Theorem 5 ([19]) Every dependence logic sentence φ is logically equivalent to some ESO sentence φ∗,
and vice versa.
Constancy logic FO(=(·)) is the fragment of dependence logic which only allows functional dependence
atoms of the form =( /0,~x), which we will abbreviate as =(~x) and call constancy atoms. Clearly we have
that
TS-const: M |=X=(~x) if and only if for all s,s′ ∈ X , s(~x) = s′(~x).
As proved in [8], every constancy logic sentence is equivalent to some first-order sentence: therefore,
constancy logic is strictly weaker than dependence logic. Nonetheless, constancy logic is more ex-
pressive than first-order logic with respect to the second-order relations generated by the satisfaction
conditions of formulas: indeed, it is an easy consequence of Proposition 4 that no first-order formula is
logically equivalent to the constancy atom =(x).
Exclusion logic FO(|), from [8], adds to first-order logic exclusion atoms ~x | ~y, where ~x and ~y are
tuples of variables of the same length. Just as functional dependence atoms correspond to functional
database-theoretic dependencies, exclusion atoms correspond to exclusion dependencies [3]; and their
satisfaction rule is
5That is, according to the terminology of [19], if and only if φ∗(R) is flat.
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TS-excl: M |=X ~x |~y if and only if X(~x)∩X(~y) = /0.
As proved in [8], exclusion logic is entirely equivalent to dependence logic: every exclusion logic for-
mula is logically equivalent to some dependence logic formula, and vice versa.
Inclusion logic FO(⊆), also from [8], adds instead to first-order logic inclusion atoms ~x ⊆~y based
on database-theoretic inclusion dependencies [6]. The corresponding rule is
TS-inc: M |=X ~x ⊆~y if and only if X(~x)⊆ X(~y).
Inclusion logic is stronger than first-order logic, but weaker than existential second-order logic: indeed,
as shown in [9], sentence-wise it is equivalent to positive greatest fixed point logic GFP+. Formula-wise,
it is incomparable with constancy, dependence or exclusion logic, since its formulas are union closed but
not downwards closed.
Independence logic FO(⊥), from [12], adds to first-order logic independence atoms~x ⊥~y with the
intended meaning of “the values of~x and~y are informationally independent”. More formally,
TS-ind: M |=X ~x ⊥~y if and only if X(~x~y) = X(~x)×X(~y).
This notion of informational independence has a long history: see for example [11] for an analysis of
this concept from a probabilistic perspective.
The conditional independence atoms ~x ⊥~z ~y, also from [12], relativize the independence of ~x and ~y
to all fixed value of~z. Their semantics is
TS-c-ind: M |=X ~x ⊥~z ~y if and only if for all tuples ~m ∈ Dom(M)|~z| and for X~z=~m = {s ∈ X : s(~z) = ~m} it
holds that X~z=~m(~x~y) = X~z=~m(~x)×X~z=~m(~y).
As pointed out in [4], the rule for ~x ⊥~z ~y corresponds precisely to the database-theoretic embedded
multivalued dependency [5] (~z։~x|~y).
In [12] it was shown that every dependence logic formula is equivalent to some FO(⊥c) (conditional
independence logic) formula, but not vice versa; and sentence-wise, both of these logics are equivalent
to each other (and to ESO). Furthermore, in [8] it was proved that FO(⊥c) is equivalent to inclu-
sion/exclusion logic6 FO(⊆, |), even with respect to open formulas, and that this is, roughly speaking,
the most general logic obtainable by adding first-order (or even existential second-order) definable de-
pendency conditions to first-order logic.7 More recently, in [10], it was shown that FO(⊥) and FO(⊥c)
are also equivalent.
We conclude this section with Figure 1, which depicts the relations between the logics we discussed
so far.
3 Upwards Closed Dependencies
In this work we will study the properties of the logics obtained by adding families of dependency con-
ditions to the language of first-order logic. But what is a dependency condition, in a general sense? The
following definition is based on the generalized atoms of [17]:
Definition 6 Let n ∈ N. A dependency of arity n is a class D, closed under isomorphisms, of models
over the signature {R} where R is a n-ary relation symbol. If ~x is a tuple of n variables (possibly with
repetitions), M is a first-order model and X is a team over it whose domain contains all variables of ~x
then
6That is, to first-order logic plus inclusion and exclusion atoms.
7To be more precise, for every ESO formula φ∗(R) there exists a FO(⊥c) formula φ(~x) such that, for all suitable models M
and nonempty teams X , M |=X φ(~x) if and only if M,X(~x) |= φ∗(R).
P. Galliani 97
FO
FO(⊆)
FO(=(·, ·)),FO(|)
FO(=(·))
FO(⊥),FO(⊥c),FO(⊆, |)
⊂
⊃
⊃
⊂
∪
FO,FO(=(·))
FO(⊆)
FO(⊥),FO(⊥c),FO(⊆, |),
FO(=(·, ·)),FO(|)
∪
∪
≡ FO
≡ GFP+
≡ ESO
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Relations between logics wrt formulas (a) and sentences (b).
TS-D: M |=X D~x if and only if (Dom(M),X(~x)) ∈D.
Definition 7 Let D = {D1,D2, . . .} be a family of dependencies. Then we write FO(D) for the logic
obtained by adding to the language of first-order logic all dependency atoms D~x, where D ∈ D and~x is
a tuple of variables of the arity of D.
It is not difficult to represent the logics of Section 2 in this notation. For example, dependence logic is
FO(=(·, ·)) for =(·, ·) = {=(n,m) : n,m ∈ N}, where (Dom(M),R) ∈ =(n,m) if and only if
~a~b,~a~c ∈ R⇒~b =~c
for all tuples of elements ~a = a1 . . .an,~b = b1 . . .bm,~c = c1 . . .cm ∈ Dom(M).
The following property can be easily verified, by induction on the formulas φ :8
Theorem 8 (Locality) Let D be a family of dependencies and let φ(~x) be a formula of FO(D) with free
variables in ~x. Then for all models M and all teams X over it whose domain contains ~x, M |=X φ(~x) if
and only if M |=X↾~x φ(~x).
In this work, we will be mainly interested in dependencies which correspond to first-order definable
properties of relations:
Definition 9 A dependency notion D is first-order definable if there exists a first-order sentence D∗(R)
over the signature {R}, where R is a new relation symbol, such that
M ∈ D⇔M |= D∗(R)
for all models M = (Dom(M),R).
8For the sake of reference, we mention Theorem 4.22 of [8] in which the same result is proved in detail for (conditional)
independence logic. The only new case here is the one in which φ(~x) = D~y for some D ∈D and~y is contained in~x; and for it
the result follows at once from condition TS-D and from the fact that X(~y) = (X ↾~x)(~y).
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It is not necessarily the case that if D is first-order definable then FO(D) and FO are equivalent with
respect to sentences. For example =(n,m)∗(R) is ∀~x~y~z(R~x~y∧R~x~z→~y =~z), where~x has length n and~y,~z
have length m; but as we said in Section 2, dependence logic is stronger than first-order logic.
When is then the case that dependency conditions can be added safely to first-order logic, without
increasing the expressive power? The following definition will provide us a partial answer:
Definition 10 A dependency notion D is upwards closed if
(Dom(M),R) ∈D,R ⊆ S ⇒ (Dom(M),S) ∈D
for all models (Dom(M),R) and all relations S over Dom(M) of the same arity of R.
It is easy to see that upwards closed dependencies induce upwards closed satisfaction rules: if D is
upwards closed, M |=X D~x and X ⊆ Y then it is always the case that M |=Y D~x. However, differently
from the case of downwards or union closure, upwards closure is not preserved by team semantics: if D
is upwards closed, φ ∈ FO(D) and M |=X φ then it is not in general true that M |=Y φ for all Y ⊇ X (for
example, let φ be a nontrivial first-order literal and recall Rule TS-lit).
Some examples of upwards closed dependencies follow:
Non-emptiness: M |=X NE if and only if X 6= /0;
Intersection: M |=X ♦(~x =~y) if and only if there exists a s ∈ X with s(~x) = s(~y);
Inconstancy: M |=X 6=(~x) if and only if |X(~x)|> 1;
n-bigness: For all n ∈N, M |=X |~x| ≥ n if and only if |X(~x)| ≥ n;
Totality: M |=X All(~x) if and only if X(~x) = Dom(M)|~x|;
Non-dependence: M |=X 6=(~x,~y) if and only if there exist s,s′ ∈ X with s(~x) = s′(~x) but s(~y) 6= s′(~y);9
Non-exclusion: M |=X ~x ∤~y if and only if there exist s,s′ ∈ X with s(~x) = s′(~y);
Infinity: M |=X |~x| ≥ ω if and only if X(~x) is infinite;
κ-bigness: For all cardinals κ , M |=X |~x| ≥ κ if and only if |X(~x)| ≥ κ .
All the above examples except infinity and κ-bigness are first-order definable. The NE atom is the adap-
tation to first-order team semantics of the non-emptiness atom introduced in [20] for the propositional
version of dependence logic, and the totality atom All is due to Abramsky and Va¨a¨na¨nen ([1]).
The main result of this section is the following:
Theorem 11 Let D be a collection of upwards closed first-order definable dependency conditions. Then
for every formula φ(~x) of FO(D) with free variables in~x there exists a first-order sentence φ∗(R), where
R is a new |~x|-ary relation symbol, such that
M |=X φ(~x)⇔M,X(~x) |= φ∗(R)
for all models M over the signature of φ and all teams X.
In particular, every sentence of FO(D) is equivalent to some first-order sentence.
Let us begin by adapting the notion of flattening of [19] to the case of an arbitrary logic FO(D):
9The same symbol 6=(~x,~y) has been used in [7] to describe a different non-dependence notion, stating that for every s ∈ X
there exists a s′ ∈ X with s(~x) = s′(~x),s(~y) 6= s′(~y). In that thesis it was proved that the resulting “non-dependence logic” is
equivalent to inclusion logic. As we will see, this is not the case for the non-dependence notion of this paper.
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Definition 12 Let D be any set of dependency conditions and let φ be a FO(D) formula. Then its
flattening φ f is the first-order formula obtained by replacing any non-first-order atom with ⊤, where ⊤
is the trivially true atom.
It is trivial to see, by induction on φ , that
Lemma 13 For all D , all φ ∈ FO(D), all models M and all teams X over M, if M |=X φ then M |=X φ f .
As we said, even if D contains only upwards closed dependency conditions it is not true that all formulas
of FO(D) are upwards closed. However, the following restricted variant of upwards closure is preserved:
Theorem 14 Let φ be a FO(D) formula, where D contains only upwards closed dependencies. Let M
be a first-order model, and let X, Y be teams such that X ⊆ Y , M |=X φ , and M |=Y φ f . Then M |=Y φ .
Proof:
The proof is by structural induction on φ .
1. If φ is a first-order literal, φ f = φ and there is nothing to prove;
2. If φ is of the form D~x for some D ∈D , M |=X φ and X ⊆ Y , then by upwards closure M |=Y φ ;
3. Suppose that M |=X φ1∨φ2 and M |=Y φ f1 ∨φ f2 . Now X =X1∪X2 for two X1, X2 such that M |=X1 φ1
and M |=X2 φ2, and therefore by Lemma 13 M |=X1 φ f1 and M |=X2 φ f2 . Furthermore, Y =Y1∪Y2 for
two Y1, Y2 such that M |=Y1 φ f and M |=Y2 φ f2 . Let Z1 = X1∪Y1 and Z2 = X2∪Y2; then Z1∪Z2 =
X ∪Y = Y , and by Proposition 4 M |=Z1 φ f1 and M |=Z2 φ f2 . But M |=X1 φ1 and X1 ⊆ Z1, so by
induction hypothesis M |=Z1 φ1; and similarly, M |=X2 φ2 and X2 ⊆ Z2, so M |=Z2 φ2. Therefore
M |=Y φ1∨φ2, as required.
4. If M |=X φ1∧φ2 then M |=X φ1 and M |=X φ2. Then by induction hypothesis, since M |=Y φ f1 and
X ⊆Y , M |=Y φ1; and similarly, since M |=Y φ f2 and X ⊆Y , M |=Y φ2, and therefore M |=Y φ1∧φ2.
5. If M |=X ∃vφ then there is a function H : X → P(Dom(M))\{ /0} such that M |=X [H/v] φ , and
therefore (by Lemma 13) such that M |=X [H/v] φ f . Similarly, if M |=Y ∃vφ f then for some K we
have that M |=Y [K/v] φ f . Now let W : Y →P(Dom(M))\{ /0} be such that
W (s) =
{
H(s)∪K(s) if s ∈ X ;
K(s) if s ∈ Y\X .
Then Y [W/v] =X [H/v]∪Y [K/v], and therefore by Proposition 4 M |=Y [W/v] φ f . Then by induction
hypothesis M |=Y [W/v] φ , since X [H/v] satisfies φ and is contained in Y [W/v]; and therefore M |=Y
∃vφ , as required.
6. If M |=X ∀vφ then M |=X [M/v] φ , and if M |=Y ∀vφ f then M |=Y [M/v] φ f . Now X [M/v] ⊆ Y [M/v],
so by induction hypothesis M |=Y [M/v] φ , and therefore M |=Y ∀vφ .

Definition 15 If θ is a first-order formula and φ is a FO(D) formula we define (φ ↾ θ) as (¬θ)∨(θ ∧φ),
where ¬θ is a shorthand for the first-order formula in negation normal form which is equivalent to the
negation of θ .
The following lemma is obvious:
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Lemma 16 For all first order θ and φ ∈ FO(D), M |=X (φ ↾ θ) if and only if M |=Y φ for Y = {s ∈ X :
M |=s θ}.
One can observe that (φ ↾ θ) is logically equivalent to θ →֒ φ , where →֒ is the maximal implication of
[16]:
TS-maximp: M |=X θ →֒ φ if and only if for all maximal Y ⊆ X s.t. M |=Y θ , M |=Y φ .
We use the notation (φ ↾ θ), instead of θ →֒ φ , to make it explicit that θ is first order and that Lemma 16
holds.
The next step of our proof of Theorem 11 is to identify a fragment of our language whose satisfaction
conditions do not involve quantification over second-order objects such as teams or functions. We do so
by limiting the availability of disjunction and existential quantification:
Definition 17 A FO(D) formula φ is clean if
1. All its disjunctive subformulas ψ1∨ψ2 are first order or of the form ψ ↾ θ for some suitable choice
of ψ and θ (where θ is first order);
2. All its existential subformulas ∃vψ are first order.
As the next proposition shows, clean formulas correspond to first-order definable properties of relations.
Proposition 18 Let D be a class of first-order definable dependencies and let φ(~x) ∈ FO(D) be a clean
formula with free variables in ~x. Then there exists some first-order sentence φ∗(R), where R is a new
|~x|-ary relation, such that
M |=X φ(~x)⇔M,X(~x) |= φ∗(R). (1)
Proof:
By induction over φ .
1. If φ(~x) is a first-order formula (not necessarily just a literal) then let φ∗(R) = ∀~x(R~x → φ(~x)). By
Proposition 4, (1) holds.
2. If φ(~x) is a dependency atom D~y, where D ∈ D and ~y is a tuple (possibly with repetitions) of
variables occurring in~x, let φ∗(R) be obtained from D∗(S) by replacing every instance S~z of S in it
with ∃~x(~z =~y∧R~x). Indeed, M |=X D~y if and only if M,X(~y) |= D∗(S), and ~m ∈ X(~y) if and only
if M,X(~x) |= ∃~x(~m =~y∧R~x).
3. If φ(~x) is of the form (ψ(~x) ↾ θ(~x)), let φ∗(R) be obtained from ψ∗(R) by replacing every instance
R~z of R with R~z∧θ(~z). Indeed, by Lemma 16 M |=X (ψ(~x) ↾ θ(~x)) if and only if M |=Y ψ(~x) for
Y = {s ∈ X : M |=s θ}, and ~m ∈Y (~x)⇔ ~m ∈ X(~x) and M |= θ(~m).
4. If φ(~x) is of the form ψ(~x)∧θ(~x) simply let φ∗(R) = ψ∗(R)∧θ∗(R).
5. If φ(~x) is of the form ∀vψ(~x,v), where we assume without loss of generality that v is distinct from
all x ∈~x, and ψ∗(S) corresponds to ψ(~x,v) then let φ∗(R) be obtained from ψ∗(S) by replacing
every S~zw with R~z. Indeed, M |=X ∀vψ if and only if M |=X [M/v] ψ(~x,v) and ~mm′ ∈ X [M/v](~xv) if
and only if ~m ∈ X(~x).

All that is now left to prove is the following:
Proposition 19 Let D be a family of upwards closed dependencies. Then every FO(D) formula is
equivalent to some clean FO(D) formula.
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Proof:
It suffices to observe the following facts:
• If φ1(~x) and φ2(~x) are in FO(D) then φ1(~x)∨φ2(~x) is logically equivalent to
(φ f1 ∨φ f2 )∧ (φ1 ↾ φ f1 )∧ (φ2 ↾ φ f2 ).
Indeed, suppose that M |=X φ1∨φ2: then, by Lemma 13, M |=X φ f1 ∨φ f2 . Furthermore, X = Y ∪Z
for two Y and Z such that M |=Y φ1 and M |=Z φ2. Now let Y ′ = {s ∈ X : M |=s φ f1 } and Z′ = {s ∈
X : M |=s φ f2 }: by Lemma 13 and Proposition 4 we have that Y ⊆Y ′ and that Z ⊆ Z′, and therefore
by Theorem 14 M |=Y ′ φ1 and M |=Z′ φ2. Thus by Lemma 16 M |=X (φ1 ↾ φ f1 ) and M |=X (φ2 ↾ φ f2 ),
as required.
Conversely, suppose that M |=X (φ f1 ∨φ f2 )∧ (φ1 ↾ φ f1 )∧ (φ2 ↾ φ f2 ). Then let Y = {s ∈ X : M |=s φ f1 }
and Z = {s ∈ X : M |=s φ f2 }. By Proposition 4 and since M |=X φ f1 ∨φ f2 , X =Y ∪Z; and by Lemma
16, M |=Y φ1 and M |=Z φ2. So M |=X φ1∨φ2, as required.
• If φ(~x,v) ∈ FO(D) then ∃vφ(~x,v) is logically equivalent to
(∃vφ f (~x,v))∧∀v(φ(~x,v) ↾ φ f (~x,v)).
Indeed, suppose that M |=X ∃vφ(~x,v). Then by Lemma 13 M |=X ∃vφ f (~x,v). Furthermore, for
some H : X → P(Dom(M))\{ /0} and for Y = X [H/v] it holds that M |=Y φ(~x,v). Now let Z =
{h ∈ X [M/v] : M |=h φ f (~x,v)}. By Proposition 4, M |=Z φ f (~x,v); and since Y ⊆ Z, by Theorem
14 M |=Z φ(~x,v), and therefore by Lemma 16 M |=X [M/v] (φ(~x,v) ↾ φ f (~x,v)), as required.
Conversely, suppose that M |=X (∃vφ f (~x,v))∧∀v(φ(~x,v) ↾ φ f (~x,v)). Then, for all s∈X , let K(s)=
{m ∈ Dom(M) : M |=s[m/v] φ f (~x,v)}. Since M |=X ∃vφ f (~x,v), K(s) is nonempty for all s ∈ X , and
by construction X [K/v] = {s ∈ X [M/v] : M |=s φ f (~x,v)}. Now M |=X [M/v] (φ(~x,v) ↾ φ f (~x,v)), so
by Lemma 16 M |=X [K/v] φ(~x,v) and in conclusion M |=X ∃vφ(~x,v).
Applying inductively these two results to all subformulas of some φ ∈ FO(D) we can obtain some clean
φ ′ to which φ is equivalent, and this concludes the proof.

Finally, the proof of Theorem 11 follows at once from Propositions 18 and 19.
Since, as we saw, the negations of functional and exclusion dependencies are upwards closed, we
obtain at once the following corollary:
Corollary 20 Any sentence of FO(6=(·, ·), ∤) (that is, of first-order logic plus negated functional and
exclusion dependencies) is equivalent to some first-order sentence.
4 Adding Constancy Atoms
As we saw in the previous section, upwards closed dependencies can be added to first-order logic without
increasing its expressive power (with respect to sentences); and as mentioned in Section 2, this is also
true for the (non upwards-closed) constancy dependencies =(~x).
But what if our logic contains both upwards closed and constancy dependencies? As we will now
see, the conclusion of Theorem 11 remains valid:
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Theorem 21 Let D be a collection of upwards closed first-order definable dependency conditions. Then
for every formula φ(~x) of10 FO(=(·),D) with free variables in~x there exists a first-order sentence φ∗(R),
where R is a new |~x|-ary relation symbol, such that
M |=X φ(~x)⇔M,X(~x) |= φ∗(R).
In particular, every sentence of FO(D) is equivalent to some first-order sentence.
The main ingredient of our proof will be the following lemma.
Lemma 22 Let D be any family of dependencies and let φ(~x) be a FO(=(·),D) formula. Then φ(~x) is
equivalent to some formula of the form ∃~v(=(~v)∧ψ(~x,~v)), where ψ ∈ FO(D) contains exactly the same
instances of D-atoms (for all D ∈D) that φ does, and in the same number.
The proof of this lemma is by induction on φ , and it is entirely analogous to the corresponding proof
from [8].
Now we can prove Theorem 21.
Proof:
Let φ(~x) be a FO(=(·),D)-formula. Then by Lemma 22 φ(~x) is equivalent to some sentence of the
form ∃~v(=(~v)∧ψ(~x,~v)), where ψ(~x,~v) ∈ FO(D). But then by Theorem 11 there exists a first-order
formula ψ∗(S) such that M |=X ψ(~x,~v) if and only if M,X(~x~v) |= ψ∗(S). Now let θ(R,~v) be obtained
from ψ∗(S) by replacing any S~y~z with R~y∧~z =~v. Since X [~m/~v](~x~v) = {~a~m :~a ∈ X(~x)} it is easy to see
that M |=X ∃~v(=(~v)∧ψ(~x,~v)) if and only if M,X(~x) |= ∃vθ(R,~v), and this concludes the proof.

5 Possibility, Negated Inclusion and Negated Conditional Independence
By Corollary 20, the negations of exclusion and functional dependence atoms can be added to first-
order logic without increasing its power. But what about the negations of inclusion and (conditional)
independence? These are of course first-order definable, but they are not upwards closed: indeed, their
semantic rules can be given as
TS-6⊆: M |=X ~x 6⊆~y if and only if there is a s ∈ X such that for all s′ ∈ X , s(~x) 6= s′(~y);
TS-6⊥c: M |=X ~x 6⊥~z ~y if and only if there are s,s′ ∈ X with s(~z) = s′(~z) and such that for all s′′ ∈ X ,
s′′(~x~z) 6= s(~x~z) or s′′(~y~z) 6= s(~y~z).
However, we will now prove that, nonetheless, FO(6=(·, ·), 6⊆, ∤, 6⊥c) is equivalent to FO on the level of
sentences. In order to do so, let us first define the following possibility operator and prove that it is
uniformly definable in FO(=(·), 6=(·)):
Definition 23 Let φ be any FO(D) formula, for any choice of D . Then
TS-♦: M |=X ♦φ if there exists a Y ⊆ X, Y 6= /0, such that M |=Y φ .
Lemma 24 Let φ be any FO(D) formula, for any D . Then ♦φ is logically equivalent to
∃u0u1∃v(=(u0)∧=(u1)∧ (v = u0∨ v = u1)∧ (φ ↾ v = u1)∧ 6=(v)). (2)
10Here =(·) represents the class of all constancy dependencies of all arities. But it is easy to see that the one of arity 1 would
suffice: indeed, if~x is x1 . . .xn then =(~x) is logically equivalent to =(x1)∧ . . .∧=(xn).
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Proof:
Suppose that there is a Y ⊆ X , Y 6= /0, such that M |=Y φ . Then let 0,1 ∈ Dom(M) be such that 0 6= 1, let
H : X [01/u0u1]→P(Dom(M))\{ /0} be such that
H(s[01/u0u1]) =
{
{0,1} if s ∈ Y ;
{0} if s ∈ X\Y
and let Z = X [01/u0u1][H/v]. Clearly M |=Z=(u0)∧ =(u1)∧ (v = u0 ∨ v = u1)∧ (φ ↾ v = u1), and it
remains to show that M |=Z 6=(v). But by hypothesis Y is nonempty, and therefore there exists a s∈Y ⊆ X
such that {s[010/u0u1v],s[011/u0u1v]} ⊆ Z. So v is not constant in Z, as required, and X satisfies (2).
Conversely, suppose that X satisfies (2), let 0 and 1 be our choices for u0 and u1, and let H be the
choice function for v. Then let Y = {s ∈ X : 1 ∈H(s[01/u0u1])}. By locality, Lemma 16 and the fact that
M |=X [01H/u1u2v] (φ ↾ v = u1) we have that M |=Y φ ; and Y is nonempty, since
M |=Z (v = u0∨ v = u1)∧ 6=(v).

It is now easy to see that the negations of inclusion and conditional independence are in FO(=(·), 6=(·)):
Proposition 25 For all~x,~y with |~x|= |~y|,~x 6⊆~y is logically equivalent to
∃~z(=(~z)∧♦(~z =~x)∧~z 6=~y).
Proposition 26 For all~x,~y and~z,~x 6⊥~z ~y is logically equivalent to
∃~p~q~r(=(~p~q~r)∧♦(~p~r =~x~z)∧♦(~q~r =~y~z)∧~p~q~r 6=~x~y~z).
Corollary 27 Every sentence of FO(6=(·, ·), 6⊆, ∤, 6⊥c) is equivalent to some sentence of
FO(=(·), 6=(·, ·), ∤), and hence to some first-order sentence.
6 Bounded Dependencies and Totality
Now that we know something about upwards closed dependencies, it would be useful to classify them in
different categories and prove non-definability results between the corresponding extensions of first-order
logic. As a first such classification, we introduce the following property:
Definition 28 (Boundedness) Let κ be a (finite or infinite) cardinal. A dependency condition D is κ-
bounded if whenever M |=X D~x there exists a Y ⊆ X with |Y | ≤ κ such that M |=Y D~x.
We say that D is bounded if it is κ-bounded for some κ .11
For example, non-emptiness and intersection are 1-bounded; inconstancy and the negations of functional
dependence and exclusion are 2-bounded; and for all finite or infinite κ , κ-bigness is κ-bounded. How-
ever, totality is not bounded at all. Indeed, for any κ consider a model M of cardinality greater than κ and
take the team X = { /0}[M/x]. Then M |=X All(x), but if Y ⊆ X has cardinality ≤ κ then Y (x)( Dom(M)
and M 6|=Y All(x).
As we will now see, the property of boundedness is preserved by the connectives of our language.
Definition 29 (Height of a formula) Let D be any family of bounded dependencies. Then for all for-
mulas φ ∈ FO(D), the height ht(φ) of φ is defined as follows:
11After a fashion, this notion of boundedness may be thought of as a dual of the notion of coherence of [15].
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1. If φ is a first-order literal then ht(φ) = 0;
2. If φ is a functional dependence atom D~x then ht(φ) is the least cardinal κ such that D is κ-
bounded;
3. If φ is of the form ψ1∨ψ2 or ψ1∧ψ2 then ht(φ) = ht(ψ1)+ht(ψ2);
4. If φ is of the form ∃vψ or ∀vψ . then ht(φ) = ht(ψ).
In other words, the height of a formula is the sum of the heights of all instances of dependency atoms
occurring in it.
Theorem 30 Let D be a family of bounded upwards closed dependencies. Then for all formulas φ ∈
FO(D)
M |=X φ ⇒∃Y ⊆ X with |Y | ≤ ht(φ) s.t. M |=Y φ .
Proof:
The proof is by induction on φ .
1. If φ is a first-order literal then ht(φ) = 0 and it is always the case that M |= /0 φ , as required.
2. If φ is an atom D~x then the statement follows at once from the definitions of boundedness and
height.
3. If φ is a disjunction ψ1 ∨ψ2 then ht(φ) = ht(ψ1)+ ht(ψ2). Suppose now that M |=X ψ1 ∨ψ2:
then X = X1∪X2 for two X1 and X2 such that M |=X1 ψ1 and M |=X2 ψ2. This implies that there
exist Y1 ⊆ X1, Y2 ⊆ X2 such that M |=Y1 ψ1 and M |=Y2 ψ2, |Y1| ≤ ht(ψ1) and |Y2| ≤ ht(ψ2). But
then Y =Y1∪Y2 satisfies ψ1∨ψ2 and has at most ht(ψ1)+ht(ψ2) elements.
4. If φ is a conjunction ψ1∧ψ2 then, again, ht(φ) = ht(ψ1)+ht(ψ2). Suppose that M |=X ψ1∧ψ2:
then M |=X ψ1 and M |=X ψ2, and therefore by Lemma 13 M |=X ψ f1 and M |=X ψ
f
2 ; and, by
induction hypothesis, there exist Y1,Y2 ⊆ X with |Y1| ≤ ht(ψ1), |Y2| ≤ ht(ψ2), M |=Y1 ψ1 and
M |=Y2 ψ2. Now let Y = Y1 ∪Y2: since Y ⊆ X , by Proposition 4 M |=Y ψ
f
1 and M |=Y ψ
f
2 . But
Y1,Y2 ⊆Y , and therefore by Theorem 14 M |=Y ψ1 and M |=Y ψ2, and in conclusion M |=Y ψ1∧ψ2.
5. If φ is of the form ∃vψ then ht(φ) = ht(ψ). Suppose that M |=X ∃vψ : then for some H we
have that M |=X [H/v] ψ , and therefore by induction hypothesis there exists a Z ⊆ X [H/v] with
|Z| ≤ ht(ψ) such that M |=Z ψ . For any h ∈ Z, let f(h) be a s ∈ X such that h ∈ s[H/v] = {s[m/v] :
m ∈ H(s)},12 and let Y = {f(h) : h ∈ Z}. Now Z ⊆ Y [H/v] ⊆ X [H/v]. Since M |=X [H/v] ψ f and
Y [H/v]⊆ X [H/v], we have that M |=Y [H/v] ψ f ; and since M |=Z ψ , this implies that M |=Y [H/v] ψ
and that M |=Y ∃vψ . Furthermore |Y |= |Z| ≤ ht(ψ), as required.
6. If φ is of the form ∀vψ then, again, ht(φ) = ht(ψ). Suppose that M |=X [M/v] ψ : again, by
induction hypothesis there is a Z ⊆X [M/v] with |Z| ≤ ht(ψ) and such that M |=Z ψ . For any h∈Y ,
let g(h) pick some s ∈ X which agrees with h on all variables except v, and let Y = {g(h) : h ∈ Z}.
Similarly to the previous case, Z ⊆Y [M/v]⊆ X [M/v]: therefore, since M |=X [M/v] ψ f we have that
M |=Y [M/v] ψ f , and since M |=Z ψ we have that M |=Y [M/v] ψ . So in conclusion M |=Y ∀vψ , as
required, and |Y |= |Z| ≤ n.

Even though constancy atoms are not upwards closed, it is possible to extend this result to FO(=(·),D).
Indeed, constancy atoms are trivially 0-bounded, since the empty team always satisfies them, and
12Since Z ⊆ X [H/v], such a s always exists. Of course, there may be multiple ones; in that case, we pick one arbitrarily.
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Corollary 31 Let D be a family of upwards closed bounded dependencies. Then for all φ ∈FO(=(·),D)
M |=X φ ⇒∃Y ⊆ X with |Y | ≤ ht(φ) s.t. M |=Y φ .
Proof:
Let φ ∈ FO(=(·),D): then by Lemma 22 φ is equivalent to some formula of the form ∃~v(=(~v)∧ψ),
where ψ does not contain constancy atoms and ht(ψ) = ht(φ). Now suppose that M |=X φ : then, for
some choice of elements ~m ∈ Dom(M)|~v|, M |=X [~m/~v] ψ . Now by Theorem 30 there exists a Z ⊆ X [~m/~v],
with |Z| ≤ ht(ψ), such that M |=Z ψ ; and Z is necessarily of the form Y [~m/~v] for some Y ⊆ X with
|Y |= |Z| ≤ ht(ψ). But then M |=Y ∃~v(=(~v)∧ψ), as required.

This result allows us to prove at once a number of nondefinability results concerning upwards closed
dependencies. For example, it is now easy to see that
Corollary 32 Let D be a family of upwards closed bounded dependencies. Then the totality dependency
All is not definable in FO(=(·),D). In particular, totality atoms cannot be defined by means of the
negations of inclusion, exclusion, functional dependence and independence atoms.
Corollary 33 Let D be a family of κ-bounded upwards closed dependencies and let κ ′ > κ be infinite.
Then κ ′-bigness is not definable in FO(=(·),D).
Corollary 34 Let D be a k-bounded upwards closed dependency, and let n > k. If φ(~x) of FO(=(·),D)
characterizes n-bigness, in the sense that for all M and X
M |=X φ(~x)⇔ |X(~x)| ≥ n,
then φ(~x) contains at least ⌈nk ⌉ instances of D.
7 Conclusions and Further Work
In this work we discovered a surprising asymmetry between downwards closed and upwards closed first-
order definable dependency conditions: whereas, as it was known since [19], the former can bring the
expressive power of a logic with team semantics beyond the first order, the latter cannot do so by their
own or even together with constancy atoms. As a consequence, the negations of the principal depen-
dency notions studied so far in team semantics can all be added to first-order logic without increasing its
expressive power.
Our original question was: how much can we get away with adding to the team semantics of first-
order logic before ending up in a higher order logic? The answer, it is now apparent, is quite a lot. This
demonstrates that team semantics is useful not only (as it has been employed so far) as a formalism for
the study of very expressive extensions of first-order logic, but also as one for that of more treatable ones.
Much of course remains to be done. The notion of boundedness of Section 6 allowed us to find some
non-definability results between our extensions; but the classification of these extensions is far from
complete. In particular, it would be interesting to find necessary and sufficient conditions for FO(D) to
be equivalent to FO over sentences. The complexity-theoretic properties of these logics, or of fragments
thereof, also deserve further investigation.
Another open issue concerns the development of sound and complete proof systems for our logics.
Of course, one can check whether a theory T implies a formula φ simply by using Theorems 11 and 21
to translate everything in first-order logic and then use one of the many well-understood proof systems
for it; but nonetheless, it could be very informative to find out directly which logical laws our formalisms
obey.
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